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Abstract
This paper contributes to biodiversity and species extinction literature by examining the relationship between corporate 
accountability in terms of species protection and factors affecting such accountability from forward-thinking companies. 
We use triangulation of theories, namely deep ecology, legitimacy, and we introduce a new perspective to the stakeholder 
theory that considers species as a ‘stakeholder’. Using Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) regression, we examine a 
sample of 200 Fortune Global companies over 3 years. Our results indicate significant positive relations between ecologically 
conscious companies that are accountable for the protection of biodiversity and species extinction and external assurance, 
environmental performance, partnerships with socially responsible organizations and awards for sustainable activities. Our 
empirical results appear to be robust in controlling for possible endogeneities. Our findings contribute to the discussion on 
the concern of species loss and habitat destruction in the context of corporate accountability, especially in responding to 
the sixth mass extinction event and COVID-19 crisis. Our results can also guide the policymakers and stakeholders of the 
financial market in better decision making.
Keywords Biodiversity · Species extinction · Deep ecology · Legitimacy · Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood · 
Stakeholders
Introduction
In recent years, policymakers, NGOs, academics, and com-
panies have devoted greater attention to the strategic impli-
cations of biodiversity loss and species extinction (hereafter 
B/E). Yet, the relationship between corporate accountability1 
in terms of species2 protection and factors affecting such 
accountability (assurance, environmental performance, 
country, partnerships, etc.) remains underexplored in 
accounting and business literature (Atkins & Atkins, 2018; 
Gaia & Jones, 2019; Reade et al., 2015). Biodiversity and 
species extinction are part of wider global environmental 
challenges facing humanity (Sobkowiak et al., 2020), with 
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
specifically SDGs 14 and 153 the most recent call to action 
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1 In this paper, we refer to accountability as companies’ disclosure 
on how to protect species to eliminate biodiversity loss in the future.
2 We identify species as the variety of plants (flora) and animals 
(fauna) that provide balanced ecosystems essential for human survival 
and welfare (Sandifer et al., 2015).
3 We refer to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) 14 ‘Life below water—Conserve and sustainably use the 
oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development’ and 
SDG 15 ‘Life on Land—Protect, restore and promote sustainable use 
of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertifi-
cation and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss’.
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to develop solutions and protect the planet from further bio-
diversity loss4 (UN, 2020a).
It is acknowledged that business activities are recognized 
as one of the main drivers of biodiversity loss and species 
extinction (Hassan et al., 2020a; Maroun & Atkins, 2018; 
Roberts et al., 2020a). Thus, we contribute to the extant lit-
erature and examine how the accountability of ecologically 
conscious/forward-thinking5 (hereafter EC/FT) companies 
can prevent further species and biodiversity loss in the future 
and align with SDGs 14 and 15. Our motivation for this 
paper is to respond to the recent calls to contribute to devel-
oping solutions for the B/E crisis (Gibassier et al., 2020). 
This research is significantly timely, as experts suggest that 
pandemics such as COVID-19 are a result of habitat loss, 
wildlife trafficking, and humanity’s destruction of biodiver-
sity (Ceballos et al., 2020; Johnson et al., 2020). Potentially, 
COVID-19 may not be an isolated pandemic; therefore, there 
must be a seismic shift from companies in valuing and pro-
tecting nature. In addition, biodiversity loss is now recog-
nized as one of the top five global risks (WEF, 2020)6 with 
severe implications for society if transformational changes 
are not made (WHO, 2020).
The above discussion motivates us to examine how EC/
FT companies that initiated efforts in conserving and pro-
tecting species before the current pandemic can influence 
companies’ reporting in the post-COVID-19 era. Therefore, 
we would expect corporates to consciously make tremen-
dous efforts in conserving biodiversity and protecting spe-
cies from extinction as companies realize their dependence 
on nature. Thus, our findings can guide and encourage com-
panies to improve future reporting to achieve SDGs 14 and 
15 targets by 2030, as “accounting academics can and should 
play a substantial role helping embed policy and action at 
an organizatinal level in a way that contributes towards the 
achievement of the SDGs” (Bebbington & Unerman, 2018, 
p. 2). The findings of this study will extend the existing 
academic findings on emerging issues about B/E account-
ing (e.g., Adler et al., 2018; Atkins & Maroun, 2018; Has-
san et al., 2020a, b). The combination of the theoretical 
framework along with robust empirical findings will assist 
academics in advancing this stream of emerging literature, 
and help companies to understand how to consider various 
factors to be sustainable in the future. Additionally, this 
will give a clear indication to regulators about the changes 
required to motivate companies for preventing further B/E 
loss.
Furthermore, extant B/E literature is limited. Specifically, 
most studies employed one theoretical construct to explain 
the companies’ accountability towards the extinction of spe-
cies, which contains several caveats. We respond to the pre-
vious call (Gaia & Jones, 2019) that a single theory is not 
adequate in explaining B/E disclosure, by adopting a trian-
gulation of deep ecology, legitimacy, and stakeholder theo-
ries. By applying deep ecology and stakeholder concepts, we 
support the argument of Roberts et al. (2020b), who suggest 
that species are of fundamental value to business survival 
and are main stakeholders in society; therefore, companies 
should consider species as an important stakeholder of their 
business. Legitimacy theory can explain how a company’s 
legitimacy can be achieved by considering species as impor-
tant as other stakeholders in company operations. The com-
prehensive theoretical model allows us to contribute to the 
limitation of the extant literature theoretically. To date, semi-
nal contributions in literature stimulate the development of 
species protection by providing extinction accounting frame-
works (Atkins & Maroun, 2018; Hassan et al., 2020b) and 
examination of organizational accountability for biodiversity 
(Adler et al., 2018; Maroun et al., 2018). Emerging studies 
(e.g., Raar et al., 2020) open a debate on how the incorpora-
tion of biodiversity accountability can assist in the preven-
tion of further species loss. Flowing from extant literature, 
this paper builds on these bodies of work to empirically 
examine company disclosure on species and what factors 
motivate relationships for such disclosure. This research 
responds to Roberts et al. (2020b) who identify the urgency 
in B/E literature for the examination of species protection 
disclosure to extend knowledge in the field and contribute 
to advancing solutions.
Based on the above discussion, the objective of this paper 
is to investigate factors affecting the relationship between cor-
porate accountability and species protection of EC/FT compa-
nies. We believe that providing disclosure on species protec-
tion enhances stakeholders’ trust and accountability (Hassan 
et al., 2020b). To empirically test our idea, this study uses a 
sample of the top 200 companies from Fortune Global in 2012, 
2014, and 2016, to highlight how EC/FT companies reported 
on the protection of species before the recent pandemic and 
6 The recent Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform and Ecosys-
tem Services Global Assessment Report (IPBES, 2019) outlines one 
million species which are under threat from extinction within dec-
ades if transformational changes are not made. Such species decline 
challenges organizational viability as they are dependent on healthy 
ecosystems providing natural assets for sustainable economic activity 
(European Business and Biodiversity Campaign, 2020). Although no 
monetary value can be placed on natural assets (Jones & Solomon, 
2013), the value ecosystems provide in resources is estimated to be 
between $125 to $145 trillion per year (Costanza et al., 2014), high-
lighting the intrinsic worth of natural resources to businesses.
5 We define ecologically conscious or forward-thinking companies as 
those companies that realize the importance of biodiversity and spe-
cies extinction and have provided disclosure on how to protect both 
biodiversity and species before the COVID-19 crisis. Therefore, we 
use ecologically conscious and forward-thinking companies inter-
changeably.
4 We define biodiversity loss as the decline of the infrastructure of 
ecosystems caused by the abuse from human and business overex-
ploitation (Hassan et al., 2020a; Roberts et al., 2020a).
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provide a springboard to develop solutions after the pandemic. 
These companies directly or indirectly make significant use 
of ecosystems, and therefore gain the most public attention 
(Adler et al., 2018; Hassan et al., 2020b). Our justification is to 
present how EC/FT companies report on conserving and pro-
tecting biodiversity and species, which could influence report-
ing in the recent and coming years. By applying advanced 
empirical analysis, we find that companies that are disclosing 
responsibly about species and are actively protecting against 
extinction, for which these companies are recognized by 
awards, have extended partnerships with species protection 
organizations and are also getting favorable assurance for their 
business.
The study makes several contributions to the extant B/E 
literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have 
examined the relationship between species disclosed by organ-
izations and its determinant factors. Therefore, this paper aims 
to close this gap by contributing to the extant B/E literature 
and demonstrate how EC/FT companies are displaying signifi-
cant efforts on species protection and restoring habitats. Sec-
ond, theoretically, we adopt a triangulation of theories; deep 
ecology, legitimacy and stakeholder theories. We also suggest 
that species should be considered as one of the main stake-
holders’ categories in addition to customers, employees, etc., 
as businesses have a two-way relationship with biodiversity 
and species, including both the impact of companies on bio-
diversity and the impact of biodiversity on companies (Adler 
et al., 2018). Third, our paper has an empirical contribution. 
Instead of adopting OLS regression that is commonly used by 
previous studies (Adler et al., 2018; Hassan et al., 2020b), we 
test and create Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) 
regression with a multi-way fixed effects model. We believe 
the PPML model is more relevant to explore the relationship 
between the species disclosed by companies and determinant 
factors because our disclosure index includes positive count 
values only. Fourth, our study has a number of implications for 
policymakers. The proposed empirical model and theoretical 
framework in this study will allow policymakers to process a 
post-2020 framework to reshape the global relation with nature 
(UN, 2020b) and support the United initiatives and achieve the 
SDGs 14 and 15 objectives. The study will guide decision-
makers to understand how disclosure of species protection by 
companies can assist society to mitigate further B/E loss in 
the future. Finally, our paper responds to recent calls (Gaia 
& Jones, 2019; Lambooy et al., 2018) to develop solutions by 
showing how the potential for reporting for B/E can mitigate 
the further risk of ecological collapse.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next sec-
tion covers the literature review. Section three discusses the 
theoretical literature. Section four discusses empirical litera-
ture and hypothesis development. Section five illustrates the 
research design. Section six presents the empirical analysis. 
Finally, a discussion of findings and limitations is exhibited 
in the last section.
Corporate Accountability, Ecology, 
and Species Extinction Protection Around 
the World
Research on corporate accountability for B/E is in its 
infancy (Addison et al., 2019; Adler et al., 2017) and is 
an emerging strand of literature (Haque & Jones, 2020). 
To date, academics have been relatively silent on examin-
ing the role of companies in conserving biodiversity and 
species protection (Adler et al., 2018) and thus, there is 
a huge call for company awareness from stakeholders of 
businesses (Hassan et al., 2020b). To provide context, 
B/E accounting emerges from biodiversity reporting and 
this extends to include the ‘extinction’ element due to the 
severity of the decline of nature (Atkins & Maroun, 2018). 
The early seeds of biodiversity reporting were set by Jones 
(1996) who suggested that organizations are stewards of 
natural capital and have a moral duty to protect and to 
publicly disclose their efforts (Atkins et al., 2014). Early 
empirical studies began to explore reporting of compa-
nies on biodiversity issues at country level (Boiral, 2016; 
Rimmel & Jonäll, 2013; van Liempd & Busch, 2013) 
and industry level (Adler et al., 2017; Boiral & Heras-
Saizarbitoria, 2017). Prior studies are consistent in finding 
that most companies provide poor disclosure, vague state-
ments, and are generally unimpressive with their efforts to 
manage and protect biodiversity. Literature suggests that 
companies fail to recognize the risk of biodiversity loss, 
leaving them unconvinced that conservation warrants their 
efforts (Skouloudis et al., 2019). It seems to be only when 
endeavors provide rewards of stakeholder impressions or 
reputational advantage that companies will pay attention 
(Bhattacharya & Managi, 2013; Hassan et al., 2020b).
It is argued that biodiversity reporting on its own is 
insufficient (Atkins & Maroun, 2018; King & Atkins, 
2016). The widely adopted Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI) standards only make some reference to biodiversity 
(Jones & Solomon, 2013), and therefore company account-
ability is limited. Companies following the GRI frame-
work are found to be indulging in impression management 
(Gray & Milne, 2018; Solomon et al., 2013), with a lack of 
consistent, transparent reporting. Atkins and Atkins (2018) 
suggest that continuing to report in this method will lead 
to a fossil record of species. Haque and Jones (2020) sup-
port the previous arguments and mention that companies 
are using GRI standards as a mechanism to refer to bio-
diversity, providing symbolic statements and failing to 
provide clarity on operational impact to natural capital.
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In response to the limitation mentioned above, extinc-
tion accounting evolves from biodiversity reporting by 
critically recognizing the need to address the current 
extinction crisis (Atkins & Maroun, 2018). Incorporating 
GRI biodiversity principles, extinction accounting aims 
to promote change by companies and reverse species loss 
(Atkins & Atkins, 2018; King & Atkins, 2016), providing 
companies opportunity to disclose how they are acting to 
prevent further extinctions (Hassan et al., 2020b).
The framework provides the opportunity to include nar-
rative detail and self-reflection, and to further articulate 
extinction prevention measures with the hope that this 
will lead to changes in company behavior (Hassan et al., 
2020b). Furthermore, companies should seek to consolidate 
numerical data and narrative and pictorial evidence to com-
prehensively communicate conservation efforts (Atkins & 
Maroun, 2020). Atkins (2020) argues that companies should 
be integrating extinction accounting into annual reports to 
trigger change and would have to “assess the populations 
of threatened species living near their operations; work 
out whether their business puts them at risk; come up with 
plans to protect them; and explain them to investors”. Stud-
ies from extinction accounting give evidence of a genuine 
concern for nature and represent the need for compassion 
for species (Atkins et al., 2018; Buchling & Maroun, 2018); 
they support the idea that companies begin to acknowledge 
their dependence on natural capital. Motivated by extinction 
concern, evidence of species names emerges in corporate 
reports (Adler et al., 2018; Atkins et al., 2014). However, 
an argument builds that certain alluring or desirable species 
may attract more attention from companies than others, as 
Weir (2018) observed that mammals and birds warranted 
greater conservation efforts than insects and invertebrates. 
Atkins et al. (2014) reinforce this theory, reporting that 
favoritism may be shown towards certain species, especially 
species which are beneficial to humans.
Smith et  al. (2019) found that the corporate motiva-
tion to engage in conservation efforts is unclear. However, 
the existing studies assist companies to recognize that the 
threat of extinction is a material risk (Addison et al., 2019). 
Global policymakers are also taking the initiative to encour-
age companies to be accountable towards the extinction of 
species. For example, The Natural Capital Coalition (2020) 
urges companies to realize that their success is driven by 
ecosystems; the loss of any species to extinction is devas-
tating, but species which provide such intrinsic worth to 
industries is frightening.7 Indeed, the global Aichi targets 
of the ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020’ have been 
considered a failure as biodiversity decline is accelerating at 
an unprecedented rate, with humanity’s legacy of biodiver-
sity at a crossroads for future generations (CBD, 2020). The 
most recent call to action is the United Nations SDG targets 
‘The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’. Global 
governments have agreed on a vision of ‘Living in harmony 
with nature’ by 2050, and it is imperative lessons are learned 
from the past decade if the SDGs are to be met. The UN 
Biodiversity Conference in September 2020 emphasizes the 
need for “Urgent action on biodiversity across all sectors 
and from all actors” to meet the SDG target of 2030 (CBD, 
2020). Furthermore, the post-2020 biodiversity initiatives 
must be achieved, or humanity could potentially face future 
pandemics.
The current COVID-19 crisis provides forewarning to 
further encroachment between natural capital and humans 
that can have detrimental impacts (Carrington, 2020). Cor-
porates must make transformational changes to restore their 
relationship with nature and engage in sincere stewardship 
of natural capital, as it is their moral duty to protect future 
generations (Gaia & Jones, 2019). Turning a blind eye to 
warning signs could be catastrophic for business prosper-
ity and survival. There is no extensive literature to explain 
the accountability of companies towards species extinction. 
Therefore, in this study, we discuss how the disclosure of 
species by global companies can assist them in achieving 
environmental awards, gain assurance from Big 4,8 and 
allow companies to expand biodiversity partnerships lead-
ing to a financially sustainable company. The findings of 
this study will be an example for stakeholders of companies 
and will encourage academics to extend the studies on B/E 
to assist companies to be more accountable towards B/E. 
Furthermore, to meet SDGs 14 and 15, we offer a solution 
that can assist in preventing further decline by advocating 
that companies transform their reporting practice to include 
information on their efforts to protect biodiversity and 
species.
Theoretical Literature Review
Prior B/E research applies various theories to explain com-
pany viewpoints including impression management (Boiral, 
2016), greenwashing (Hassan et al., 2020b), and legitimacy 
(Adler et al., 2017; Bhattacharyya & Yang, 2019). However, 
we observe that companies have not done enough to protect 
species from extinction, and, as experts explain, it may be 
that this is one of the reasons for zoonotic disease spillover 
7 For example, crop production which has an estimated annual 
valuation of $577 billion, is under threat from pollination loss and 
bee decline (The World Bank, 2020), threatening the food industry. 
Approximately 70% of cancer drugs are derived from plant spe-
cies, consequently threatening the pharmaceutical industry (PWC & 
WWF, 2020).
8 Big4—one of the big four accounting firms: Deloitte, Ernst & 
Young, KPMG, PwC.
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such as COVID-19 (Ceballos et al., 2020). Lack of a com-
prehensive theoretical model cannot motivate companies 
to identify a strategy for species protection. Therefore, we 
introduce a triangulation of theories, namely deep ecology, 
legitimacy, and stakeholder theories. Deep ecologists are of 
the view that nature has intrinsic value, and all nonhuman 
life should be preserved (Naess, 1989, 2008), thus rejecting 
anthropocentric shallow ecology, which places humans of 
most importance, believing nature has value because of what 
it contributes to human satisfaction (Callicot, 1990, 1994; 
Thompson & Barton, 1994). Deep-ecologists debate whether 
environmental and extinction crises are human-induced 
(Samkin et al., 2014) and support the suggestion that the 
crisis is the result of dominating anthropocentric bias in cor-
porate behavior (Atkins et al., 2014). Absolute deep ecol-
ogy would reject business use of natural assets as a com-
modity. However, to mitigate corporate financial risk and 
prevent societal collapse, a middle ground must be reached. 
Companies must consider embedding an ecological culture 
and stewardship (Jones, 1996) by protecting and investing 
in nature. For example, Gaia and Jones (2019) found that 
elements of deep ecology must be ethically rooted to enable 
a sustainable society. Similarly, Samkin et al. (2014) found 
deep ecology embedded in biodiversity disclosures and men-
tion that the approach requires a long-term commitment. 
Embracing deep ecology is not to put a financial value on 
species as this would be refuted by deep-ecologists; rather, 
companies must evaluate their behavior and engage in a 
balanced perspective to mitigate the risk of financial loss, 
together with responsibly protecting species and habitats. 
The relationship with nature must be realigned and eliminate 
the arrogant profit-seeking objectives, which have driven us 
to a planetary emergency (Gray & Milne, 2018).
Empirical evidence considers corporates to be rife in 
legitimizing activities (Boiral & Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2017; 
Cho & Patten, 2007; Milne & Gray, 2013; Patten, 2002). 
Extant literature considers B/E accounting as a continua-
tion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) research into 
corporate disclosure practices (Bebbington & Larrinaga, 
2014; Hassan et al., 2020b). Legitimacy theory is one of the 
most applied theories to explain the increasing CSR report-
ing over the past two decades (Hassan & Guo, 2017) and it 
“involves the selective disclosure of positive actions result-
ing in misleading and biased reporting” (Mahoney et al., 
2013, p. 352). Extant literature uses legitimacy theory to 
explain that dishonest companies misreport their CSR efforts 
to capitalize on their face value to influence stakeholders’ 
perceptions and gain legitimacy (Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; 
Zijl et al., 2017).
Adler et al. (2018) argue that biodiversity and threat-
ened species information is provided in order to fulfil the 
desires and expectations of stakeholders. Bhattacharyya 
and Yang (2019) specifically note that considering the 
current planetary emergency, for businesses to gain soci-
etal legitimacy, they must increase biodiversity disclosure. 
Lewis (2016) explains that legitimacy is a practice that is 
deceivingly used to endorse that organizations’ policies 
or practices are environmentally friendly, when arguably 
they are not. Patten (2015), for example, explains that an 
organization with specific environmental adversity intensi-
fies the extent of CSR reporting to signal to stakeholders 
that the organization is addressing the concern. This con-
tinues a tradition of impression management-oriented lit-
erature in environmental accounting (Hassan et al., 2020a, 
b). This research argues that companies provide disclosure 
to legitimize companies’ concerns for B/E issues (Adler 
et al., 2018; Cho et al., 2015a; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011).
As the species extinction crisis intensifies, it can be 
expected that companies must meet external pressures 
(Rimmel & Jonäll, 2013) and enhance reputation to main-
tain their “licence to operate” (Adler et al., 2017, p. 1714). 
Research highlights that stakeholder and legitimacy theo-
ries overlap in social and environmental studies (Deegan, 
2002; Gaia & Jones, 2017, 2019). Stakeholder theory has 
been used to explain the needs and expectations of human 
groups and individuals affected by the company (Boiral 
& Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2017; Gaia & Jones, 2019). The-
oretically, we recognize a limitation within stakeholder 
literature that prior studies have failed to recognize or 
explain for the prevention of further species loss. Roberts 
et al. (2020b) argue that species should be included as a 
main stakeholder with the established groups of employ-
ees, NGOs, government agencies, environmental groups, 
and customers (Jones, 1995; Schaltegger et al., 2017). We 
believe that for deep ecology to be embedded in corporate 
strategy, species of flora and fauna should be considered 
as one of the main stakeholders’ categories, discarding 
human hierarchy, for companies to protect and restore 
species and their habitats. In this vein, we focus on a tri-
angulation of deep ecology, legitimacy, and stakeholder 
theories, which can explain the relationship between spe-
cies numbers and determinant factors. We recognize that 
corporates may be disclosing species-specific informa-
tion for legitimizing purposes, but we are also hopeful 
that those companies who are disclosing species numbers 
have started to realize the intrinsic worth of natural capital 
and are consequently embedding ecological culture and 
displaying a genuine concern for the extinction crisis by 
identifying species as stakeholders. We hope that provid-
ing disclosure on species protection will be the new norm 
for other companies to follow. Societal health is under-
pinned by nature (Roberts et al., 2020a); we expect that by 
application of the triangulation of theories, we can assist 
companies to explain the underlying motivation to reform 
B/E impact, which will reduce potential future pandemics 
(Ceballos et al., 2020).
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Empirical Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Development
B/E accounting is considered as an extension of CSR (Beb-
bington & Larrinaga, 2014; Bhattacharyya & Yang, 2019; 
Hassan et al., 2020b). From the existing literature, we 
identified that the assurance by leading assurance provid-
ers, presence of partnerships, environmental performance, 
and environmental award are some important factors that 
will assist the stakeholders to assess the accountability of 
the companies towards nature. In the following section, we 
discuss these factors in detail to develop the hypotheses 
related to the research question, which is supported by the 
comprehensive theoretical model explained previously.
Species and Assurance
Sustainability reporting is established in mainstream 
practice to meet the needs of societal expectations (Junior 
et al., 2014; Kolk & Perego, 2010). However, it is argued 
in the literature that the reliability and quality of informa-
tion falls short (Cho et al., 2015a). Boiral et al. (2018) 
imply that information can be biased and reporting by 
companies is used as a window-dressing activity (Boiral, 
2016), and thus, the credibility of information is ques-
tioned (Gray, 2010). To enhance the quality and credibility 
of sustainable reporting in literature, we find that compa-
nies prefer to use third-party assurance from accounting 
firms (Maroun, 2018). Involvement of third parties can 
increase the confidence of the stakeholders in disclosure 
(Simnettt et al., 2009). Human stakeholders perceive the 
professionally audited reports from the external assurance 
provider as a confident and legitimate report of the com-
pany performance (Cho et al., 2015a).
Because of the immense presence of independence in 
the report prepared by the external assurance provider, 
companies who are under public pressure due to poor per-
formance may prefer to seek external independent assur-
ance to indicate a better performance to the stakeholders 
(Boiral et al., 2018; Maroun, 2018). But external assurance 
is also required to identify which companies are better 
in addressing the B/E risk, which is prominent (IPBES, 
2019) and related to human behavior. The external assur-
ance report can help the stakeholders to understand how 
the companies are following deep ecology principles by 
engaging in the stewardship of natural capital (Bhattacha-
ryya & Yang, 2019). Legitimacy theory has been domi-
nant in the social and environmental accounting litera-
ture (Belal & Owen, 2015; Giordano-Spring et al., 2015). 
Many studies (e.g., Ball & Craig, 2010; Cho, 2009; Cho & 
Patten, 2007; Hassan & Guo, 2017; Patten, 2015; Tilling 
& Tilt, 2010) empirically examine legitimacy theory and 
support the argument that companies voluntarily provide 
environmental information to gain legitimacy. The theory 
also predicts that organizations who are more likely to 
be subject to public pressure and legitimacy threats due 
to negative CSR performance may hire third parties to 
provide assurance to indicate favorable performance 
(Boiral, 2016; Cho et al., 2014; Maroun, 2018). Conse-
quently, independent third-party assurance can help to 
deflect attention from negative B/E performance, lessen 
legitimacy risks, and install improved confidence among 
stakeholders (Gürtürk & Hahn, 2016; Perego & Kolk, 
2012). More specifically, these firms actively hire third 
parties that provide limited assurance to portray that the 
B/E information released in CSR reports is credible, in 
order to improve stakeholders’ confidence and enhance 
corporate reputation and perceived legitimacy (Cho et al., 
2014; Odriozola & Baraibar-Diez, 2017). Nevertheless, 
as companies must comply with reporting standards, they 
may prefer the ‘low-quality assurance’ with less scrutiny, 
and thus they have opportunity to dissociate their revealed 
from their actual performance.
However, it is also evident in the literature that assur-
ance providers deliver cautious rhetoric, failing to explic-
itly address issues around the report on biodiversity (Boiral 
et al., 2019). Companies may prefer to buy less scrutinized 
‘low-quality’ assurance options to deflect from their poor 
performance (Hassan et al., 2020b), and are expected to 
select limited assurance (Braam & Peeters, 2018) outside 
of the accounting profession to focus on selected sec-
tions of the performance. In post-pandemic reporting, we 
expect companies to engage in stewardship of protecting 
species and habitats, embedding a deep-ecological culture 
by regarding species as a main stakeholder. In the future, 
assurance providers will scrutinize the company impact 
on biodiversity. Our motivation for this hypothesis is to 
extend existing literature which finds a positive relation 
between B/E disclosure and external assurance (Hassan 
et al., 2020b). Therefore, we examine whether external 
assurance is an influencing factor in protecting species. 
By applying deep ecology and stakeholder theory, compa-
nies are expected to commit to protecting species (Samkin 
et al., 2014) and valuing them as stakeholders. The contra-
dictory findings of the importance of external assurance 
motivated us to examine the influence of external assur-
ance on companies’ accountability towards the extinction 
of species. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 There is a positive relationship between the 
number of species and buying assurance from an external 
assurance provider.
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Species and Environmental Performance
Legitimacy theory helps to explain why companies with 
poor environmental performance have higher environmental 
scores (Mahoney et al., 2013). In the literature, we find that 
the more extensive disclosure companies provide, the more 
the firm’s reputation is enhanced (Cho & Patten, 2007; Cho 
et al., 2012). Poor performers are anticipated to disclose in 
order to gain legitimacy and enhance societal perception 
(Clarkson et al., 2008). Hassan et al. (2020b) classify com-
panies into poor and better performers and find companies 
with poor environmental performance disclose more and 
offer justification to defend legitimacy. Based on this argu-
ment, we expect that poor performers will disclose more 
species information to maintain legitimacy, and as a result, 
the companies can be more accountable in mitigating the 
extinction of species. If species are accepted as one of the 
main stakeholders, we expect EC/FT companies to propose 
long-term value creation and suppress demand on natural 
capital, committing to achieving SDGs 14 and 15. Our moti-
vation is to extend B/E literature (Hassan et al., 2020b) and 
contribute to it by empirically examining, in support with 
legitimacy theory, the relationship between species and poor 
environmental performers. Thus, we propose the following 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 There is a positive relationship between the 
number of species and poor performers.
Species and Environmental Award
Gaining an environmental award is an excellent way of dis-
playing positive practices to stakeholders (Cho et al., 2015b; 
Deegan, 2002), and motivates other companies to disclose 
CSR practices (Hassan & Ibrahim, 2012). Acquiring awards 
can show the true commitment of the company to natural 
capital and confirm their deep ecological perspective (Clark-
son et al., 2008). Such awards influence investors to make a 
positive decision about the company, which leads to favora-
ble future financial performance (Clarkson et al., 2011). 
Prior B/E literature suggests that companies should report 
on prizes and awards relating to conservation efforts (van 
Liempd & Busch, 2013). Awards provide an opportunity to 
signal genuine concern for nature (Adler et al., 2018; Atkins 
et al., 2014) and showcase efforts. Hassan et al. (2020b) 
exclusively find a positive association between B/E disclo-
sure and companies gaining environmental awards. Based on 
this discussion, our motivation is to extend extant literature 
and expect companies who disclose species to gain environ-
mental awards, and by doing so, deep ecology supports that 
they have considered species as stakeholders (Roberts et al., 
2020b) in their reporting in order to address the extinction 
crisis responsibly.
Hypothesis 3 There is a positive relationship between the 
number of species and getting an environmental award.
Species and Partnerships
Prior literature finds a positive relationship between B/E 
disclosure and partnership engagement (Adler et al., 2018; 
Boiral & Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2017; Hassan et al., 2020b). 
Here, partnership refers to when a company discloses a rela-
tionship with at least one conservation or wildlife organi-
zation. This can be viewed as a display of good corporate 
practice (Adler et al., 2018) and a means of seeking pub-
lic trust (Deegan, 2002). Collaborating with organizations 
such as WWF (World Wildlife Fund) or IUCN (International 
Union for Conservation of Nature) can help companies to 
engage in conservation efforts, and companies are therefore 
more likely to minimize the extinction crisis (Adler et al., 
2018). Partnership engagement will motivate companies to 
consider species as stakeholders (Atkins et al., 2018; Buch-
ling & Maroun, 2018; Zhao & Atkins, 2018). By supporting 
this concept, EC/FT companies can commit to achieving 
SDGs 14 and 15 and can align with long-term value crea-
tion. Thus, our motivation is to enhance B/E literature (Adler 
et al., 2018; Boiral & Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2017) by empiri-
cally examining the relationship with species and partner-
ship engagement. Theoretically, deep ecology perspective 
and regarding species as stakeholders, demonstrates that 
companies are preserving nature (Atkins et al., 2018) and 
showing genuine concern for the B/E crises. Thus, we expect 
that companies which engage in partnerships will disclose 
more species.
Hypothesis 4 There is a positive relationship between 




The sample for this research consists of the top 200 compa-
nies from the Fortune Global list of 2016. Purposefully, we 
considered these companies as they are typically leaders in 
CSR (KPMG, 2017), make significant use of ecosystems, 
and therefore gain the most public attention (Adler et al., 
2018; Hassan et al., 2020b). These companies represent a 
variety of industries exposed to different levels of biodi-
versity risk (Addison et al., 2019; Bhattacharya & Managi, 
2013) from diverse geographic locations (Hassan et al., 
2020b). The top 200 companies are selected from the For-
tune Global 500 list as literature supports that the remaining 
companies rarely disclose biodiversity information (Adler 
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et al., 2018; Hassan et al., 2020b). The investigation period 
is 3 years: namely, 2012, 2014, and 2016, as one of the vari-
ables, environmental performance, is calculated every 2 
years. Corporate annual and sustainability reports are down-
loaded from company websites. Sustainability reports can 
be referred to as environmental, corporate social responsi-
bility, citizenship, or such reports. Where these reports are 
missing, we manually collected relevant information from 
the annual reports. Following prior studies (Addison et al., 
2019; Adler et al., 2017), websites were not included in the 
search. In total, 600 annual and sustainability reports were 
downloaded (which are accessible on their corporate web 
pages). After controlling for an outlier, our final sample 
comprised of 599 companies. Following prior studies (Adler 
et al., 2018), we used content analysis, and by searching key-
words,9 we counted for species information. Keyword search 
and manual collection are followed in this paper to identify 
companies from 22 countries10 and 19 sectors.11
Research Variables
Dependent Variable: Number of Species
The number of species count was comprised of species 
numbers presented in quantitative terms or by naming in 
qualitative terms. A manual count of all species disclosed on 
reports were collected and recorded. The number of species 
counted was protected or conserved or noted as threatened 
with extinction by the company. Where companies disclosed 
a group of species, for example, 10 birds, we counted these 
as 10 species and so on. In the counting of species, duplicate 
references were eliminated; in other words, species referred 
to on more than one occasion were counted once.
Independent Variables
We used assurance, environmental award, presence of part-
nerships, and environmental score as independent variables 
(see Table 1). The environmental score was measured by the 
environmental well-being score from the Sustainable Soci-
ety Foundations website (Adler et al., 2018; Hassan et al., 
2020b). The scores are available per country every 2 years 
and following Hassan et al. (2020b), we classified the sample 
into poor performers (score 0–2.9) and better performers 
(score 3–5). The sample consisted of 290 poor performers 
and 309 better performers.
Control Variables
For this research, we considered leverage, firm size, and rev-
enue as control variables. In addition, we used country-level 
variables. Following Hassan et al. (2020b), we classified the 
sample into developing and developed countries, according 
to the United Nations classification. There are 177 develop-
ing and 422 developed firm-year observations in our sample. 
The industry was controlled in the study and was classified 
by risk exposure according to the three categories of the F 
& C Asset Report (2004) risk level (red is high risk; amber 
is medium risk and green is low risk).12 In accordance with 
Hassan et al. (2020b), we grouped red and amber to “high 
risk” classification, and green remained “low-risk” classifi-
cation. The total sample consisted of 219 high-risk firm-year 
observations and 380 low-risk firm-year observations. Gov-
ernance indicators are widely used in multi-country studies 
(Nguyen et al., 2015; Waldron et al., 2017) with empirical 
evidence finding a positive correlation of company perfor-
mance with country-level governance (Luo et al., 2012). 
Therefore, we added seven regularity governance level indi-
cators (see Table 1) developed by Kaufmann et al. (2011) 
collected from the World Governance Indicator dataset. In 
addition, we added World Development Indicators, like GDP 
growth, inflation, the log of forest area, and  C02 emissions 
(Spaiser et al., 2017; Stephan et al., 2015).
12 High-risk sectors (red zone) are Construction & Building Mate-
rials, Electricity, Food & Drug Retailers, Food Producers & Proces-
sors, Forestry & Paper, Leisure & Hotels, Mining, Oil & Gas, and 
Utilities. Medium risk sectors (amber zone) are Beverages, Chemi-
cals, Financial Services, General Retailers, Household Goods & 
Textiles, Personal Care & Household Products, Pharmaceuticals & 
Biotech, Support Services, Tobacco, and Transport. Low risk sectors 
(green zone) are Aerospace & Defence, Automobiles & Parts, Diver-
sified Industrials, Electronic & Electrical Equipment, Engineering 
& Machinery, Health, Information Technology Hardware, Media & 
Entertainment, Software & Computer Services, Steel & Other Metals, 
and Telecom Services.
9 The 28 keywords are "Extinct", "Extinction", "EN11", "EN12", 
‘EN13", "EN14", "Wildlife", "Habitat", "Species", "Biodiversity", 
"Biodiversity offset", "Forest", "Ecosystem", "Flora", "Fauna", 
"Endangered", "Threatened", "Vulnerable", "Accident" (relating to 
B/E), "Conservation", "Biological diversity", "Protected", "Floral/
Faunal wealth", "Rehabilitation", "Groundwater", "Marine", "Vegeta-
tion", "Wetlands" (Adler et al., 2018).
10 Countries are Australia (9), Brazil (12), China (120), France (45), 
Germany (48), India (3), Italy (12), Japan (57), Luxembourg (3), 
Malaysia (3), Mexico (6), Netherlands (12), Norway (3), Russia (12), 
Singapore (3), South Korea (15), Spain (6), Switzerland (15), Taiwan 
(3), Thailand (3), United Kingdom (24), and USA (186).
11 The 19 sectors are Aerospace (21), Apparel (3), Chemicals (6), 
Energy (99), Construction (18), Financial (144), Food & Beverage 
and Tobacco (15), Food & Drugs (33), Health care (30), Household 
products (6), Industrial (18), Materials (12), Media (3), Motor Vehi-
cles and parts (48), Retails (21), Technology (42), Telecommunica-
tion (33), Transportation (15), and Wholesalers (33).




Our results show that 452 out of 599 reports (75%) failed 
to disclose any species numbers (refer to Fig. 1). These 
findings support prior literature (Adler et al., 2018; Bhat-
tacharya & Managi, 2013) and suggest a call for awareness 
among companies (Rimmel & Jonäll, 2013; Hassan et al., 
2020b). However, the remaining EC/FT companies, 147 
out of 599 (representing 25%), provided species numbers, 
demonstrating ecological awareness by engaging in con-
servation efforts to protect and restore species and habi-
tats, valuing species as stakeholders. We found a slight 
increase in species numbers over years which optimis-
tically displays a deep-ecological view with companies 
being self-aware of the fundamental value of the planet 
(Hassan et al., 2020b). The declaration of the SDGs in 
2015 may also explain the increase. We acknowledge that 
this is a small proportion of the sample. However, these 
EC/FT companies provide seminal knowledge in establish-
ing relationships between species and developing solu-
tions to meet SDGs 14 and 15. These disclosures may be 
a reporting exercise to manage impressions. However, we 
expect post COVID-19 that there will be a seismic shift in 
company reporting and committing to protecting nature, 
and therefore justify the significance of our results.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for all vari-
ables used in the study. The average number of species 
disclosed by companies is about 3 species with a standard 
deviation of 21. This implies that there is a significant 
difference in the reported species among the companies. 
We further nalysed by country and found developing coun-
tries have a higher mean score for the number of species 
(i.e., 3.458) than developed countries (i.e., 2.614). This 
supports the recent arguments, where experts believe that 
developing countries are to blame for the COVID-19 pan-
demic due to illegal wildlife trade and wet markets and 
call for enforcing the banning of such trades to prevent 
further pandemics and extinctions and forcing companies 
to become socially responsible (Ceballos et al., 2020; Ma 
et al., 2020). Legitimacy theory explains that develop-
ing countries provide more species to maintain societal 
legitimacy and reputation (Adler et al., 2018; Bhattacha-
ryya & Yang, 2019). We found developed countries have 
a higher mean score for assurance, environmental award, 
partnerships, Big4, leverage, governance, industry, and 
 CO2 emissions, which is similar to prior studies on CSR 
(Bouten et al., 2011; Tagesson et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
the developing countries had a higher mean score for 
environmental score, firm size, GDP, and inflation which 
Table 1  Research variables
Definition and coding
Dependent variable Number of species—Total count of number of species collected from published annual reports
Independent variable Assurance—has a value of “1” if the company has assurance and a value of “0” if not. Data collected from published 
annual reports
Assurance by Big4—Company has a value of “1” if assured by one of the big four accounting firms (KPMG, E&Y, PwC, 
or Deloitte), and a value of “0” if not. Data collected from published annual reports
Environmental Award—value of “1” if award is given, value of “0” if not. Data collected from published annual reports
Environmental Score—Company is given a value of “1” if classified a ‘poor performer’ and a value of “0” if classified 
a better performer. Data collected from Sustainable Society Foundation (SSF). Score is calculated every 2 years and is 
used in prior studies (Adler et al., 2018; Hassan et al., 2020a, b)
Presence of Partnerships—Presence of biodiversity/wildlife partnerships, value of “1” given if one or more present, value 
of “0” if none. Data collected from published annual reports
Control variables Country—Value of “1” given if the country is classified as developed and a value of “0” if developing. Data retrieved 
from United Nations website
Industry—Company has a value of “1” if classified as red/amber-risk zone, and a value of “0” if classified as a green risk-
zone. Classification recommended by F & C Asset Report (2004)
Governance—Is the average score of voice & accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regularity qual-
ity, rule of law, control of corruption and corruption index taken from Worldbank.org
GDP growth—(annual%)—World Development Indicator. Data collected from Worldbank.org
Inflation—GDP deflator (annual%) World Development Indicator. Data collected from Worldbank.org
Log (Forest area)—Forest areas (sq. km)—World development indicator. Data collected from Worldbank.org
CO2 emission—(metric tonnes per capita)—World Development Indicator. Data collected from Worldbank.org
Log (Revenue)—Data collected from published annual reports
Leverage—Total debt/total assets. Data collected from published annual reports
Firm size—Natural logarithm of total assets. Data collected from published annual reports
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supports the literature that finds a positive relation with 
CSR disclosure (Chiu & Wang, 2014; Huang & Kung, 
2010).
Table 3 provides the correlation matrix of all variables 
included in the study. To identify any multicollinearity prob-
lems, we followed prior studies (Bhattacharyya & Yang, 
2019; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005) and found a maximum of 
0.161 as a correlation coefficient.
We tested the presence of multicollinearity by calculating 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance values for 
each of the explanatory and control variables, as presented in 


















R E PORTS F I RMS AWARD AS SURANCE B IG4 POP
Distr ibuon of  Key Informaon
Series1 Series2
Fig. 1  This figures shows a distribution of key information of our 
data from 599 annual reports of 200 firms. Series 1 represents the 
reports where firms did not report any species and Series 2 docu-
ments the reports in which firms included the names of species (we 
counted the number of species as explained in the data description). 
REPORTS is the number of reports in our data. FIRMS is the num-
ber of firms (during 2012–2016) in each set of Series. AWARD is the 
number of reports indicating the firms received environment award. 
ASSURANCE is the number of reports which mention whether the 
firms receive assurance. BIG 4 is a subset of ASSURANCE indicat-
ing whether the assurance received from BIG 4. POP represents the 
number of reports which mentions the presence of biodiversity/wild-
life partnerships
Table 2  Summary statistics of the variables used in our models
Full sample Developing country Developed country Difference in means
Obs Mean Median St.Dev Obs Mean Obs Mean t-test
Number of species 599 2.863 0.000 21.552 177 3.458 422 2.614 0.844
Buying assurance 599 0.679 1.000 0.467 177 0.599 422 0.714  − 0.115**
Environment score 599 0.065 0.000 0.250 177 0.170 422 0.021 0.148***
Green 599 0.658 1.000 0.475 177 0.588 422 0.687  − 0.100**
Environment award 599 0.199 0.000 0.399 177 0.186 422 0.204  − 0.018
Presence of partnership 599 0.237 0.000 0.425 177 0.147 422 0.275  − 0.128***
Big 4 599 0.391 0.000 0.488 177 0.367 422 0.401  − 0.033
Firm size 590 12.494 11.809 2.512 171 13.276 419 12.175 1.101***
Log (revenue) 593 11.346 11.234 0.545 174 11.276 419 11.375  − 0.099**
Leverage 596 6840.108 0.383 167,000 174 16.66 422 9653.568  − 9636.907
Governance 599 0.839 1.232 0.785 177  − 0.246 422 1.294  − 1.540***
CO2 emission 400 10.426 9.200 4.645 116 7.545 284 11.602  − 4.058***
Log (forest area) 596 13.322 14.527 2.014 174 14.100 422 13.002 1.098***
GDP growth 596 2.820 2.200 2.528 174 5.681 422 1.641 4.040***
Inflation 596 1.552 1.400 1.504 174 2.344 422 1.226 1.118***
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coefficient is inflated because of the linear dependence with 
other variables, and the tolerance is the extent of variability 
of selected regressors not explained by the other regressors. 
The threshold values for VIF and tolerance are less than 10 
and more than 0.1, respectively (see Gujarati, 2003; Hair 
et al., 2013). Appendix A shows that the VIFs are below 5 
(except the Governance variable, which is 5.88). So, multi-
collinearity is not a problem for our estimations of models.
Empirical Models
To test our hypotheses, we started with OLS regression by 
using the natural logarithm of the number of species as our 
dependent variable. However, the coefficients of the regres-
sion led to inconsistent estimators of the parameters of our 
model. Following Gourieroux et al. (1984), therefore, we 
used the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) 
regression with multi-way fixed effects model, since our 
dependent variable—the number of species—is a non-neg-
ative count variable. In other words, the number of species, 
a Poisson random variable, has a discrete probability distri-
bution that indicates the probability of a given number of 
species reported in a fixed interval of time. In related simu-
lation results by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011), it shows 
that the PPML model provides better results even when the 
dependent variable contains a large number of zeros. So, we 
believe that the Poisson distribution model is appropriate for 
our data. This is because 75% of our sample did not provide 
disclosure on species protection. In general, we write our 
empirical model as
where, Y is the number of all species disclosed on financial 
reports of sample firm i in year t.
In particular, for our Poisson model, the conditional mean 
of Y in Eq. (1) is written as E(Y|X) = exp(X)
where X is the vector independent variable (shown in 
Eq. 1) and a constant. The maximum likelihood estima-
tor of  , the coefficients of relevant independent variables, 
is calculated by maximizing the following log-likelihood 
function:
where t = exp(x
�
t
) shows a model for the conditional 
mean of the number of species. However, there may exist 
a problem with the model as it imposes an assumption of 
mean–variance equality in its empirical application. Thus, an 
alternative model could be a negative binomial model. But 
our outcome variable, i.e., the number of species, seemed 
(1)
Yit = f (Buying Assurance, Environment Score, Environment Award, Green, Presence of Partnership,







− t − log(Yt)
unlikely to follow a negative binomial distribution. So, in 
accordance with Cameron and Trivedi (1990), we tested for 
over-dispersion. We failed to reject the null hypothesis of 
mean–variance equality in all the estimations. This justifies 
the use of Poisson for our sample.
Empirical Results
In Table 4, we report the results of the Poisson regression, 
to explain the results for the likelihood of the number of 
species disclosed by the companies. In addition to the coef-
ficients, we also show White’s heteroscedasticity robust 
standard errors in parenthesis.13 In Model 1 of Table 4, the 
model is estimated by traditional Poisson regression with 
year and country fixed effects. In Model 2, we report the 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) regression 
with multi-way fixed effects.
Based on the deep ecology concept, in this paper, we 
consider species as a stakeholder (Samkin et al., 2014), and 
therefore, in Hypothesis 1, we propose that there is a posi-
tive relationship between the number of species and buy-
ing assurance. The proposition in Hypothesis 1 is proven 
in Models 1 and 2, which show positive and statistically 
significant coefficients (Model 1: β = 1.129, p < 0.05; Model 
2: β = 1.131, p < 0.10, respectively) of buying assurance. 
It implies that firms with assurance are likely to report a 
greater number of species than those firms without assur-
ance. Hypothesis 1 reinforces empirical studies which have 
found that assured information is viewed as more cred-
ible and reliable, narrowing the legitimacy gap (Cho et al., 
2015a; Maroun, 2018). Theoretically, our results support 
deep ecology, legitimacy, and stakeholder theories as the 
overall increase in disclosure optimistically displays a deep-
ecological view with companies being aware of the funda-
mental value of the planet. Our results support Hassan et al. 
(2020b), which found a positive relationship between assur-
ance and biodiversity disclosures. Theoretically, our results 
align with deep ecology, evidencing that companies are 
committed to protecting species (Samkin et al., 2014), and 
valuing them as stakeholders. Additionally, these findings 
have implications for policymakers in developing solutions 
with companies providing assurance on species information. 
13 To adjust for the differences between variance and mean score, 
we use a bootstrapping method in the Poisson regression using 500 
replications (not reported). The resampling procedure with replace-
ment creates simulated datasets for the estimation. Our results remain 
qualitatively similar.
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We expect that assurance will become an integral part of 
companies committing to SDGs 14 and 15. This result is 
in line with prior studies’ stream of literature that empiri-
cally examines the assurance of a company’s CSR report. 
These studies note that stakeholders place more confidence 
in CSR reports where the level of assurance provided is rea-
sonably high (Casey & Grenier, 2015; Kolk & Perego, 2010; 
Mahoney et al., 2013; Peters & Romi, 2015; Pflugrath et al., 
2011; Simnett et al., 2009).
In addition, we consider the assurance provider as Big4. 
Big4 is a binary variable equal to 1 if the sample company 
has an auditor from one of the Big4 audit firms. The coef-
ficients in Models 1 and 2 show a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient (Model 1: β = 1.675, p < 0.001; Model 
2: β = 1.663, p < 0.001, respectively). This implies the num-
ber of species in reporting increases if the company is not 
audited by one of the big four accounting firms. This addi-
tional result confirms that auditors from the Big4 account-
ing firms may be failing to address the B/E crisis or can-
not generate awareness in the company. A deep-ecological 
concern would expect Big4 providers to relate to the need 
for uniformed reporting guidelines on species and habitat 
protection (Atkins & Atkins, 2018). Auditors from the Big4 
must regard species as a main stakeholder post-pandemic. 
To achieve SDGs 14 and 15, assurance providers like Big4 
must encourage companies to develop long-term sustain-
ability and their consultancy must include advocating the 
protection of species environmental recovery.
The coefficients of environment score in Models 1 and 2 
are positive and statistically significant (Model 1: β = 1.533, 
p < 0.10; Model 2: β = 1.530, p < 0.05, respectively). This 
supports our Hypothesis 2, which states that poor environ-
mental performers are likely to report a greater number of 
species compared to better environment performers. This 
result is consistent with prior literature that these compa-
nies disclose more to defend legitimacy (Cho et al., 2012; 
Clarkson et al., 2008). Our results support empirical studies 
that have found a positive relationship between poor envi-
ronmental performers and biodiversity disclosure (Hassan 
et al., 2020b). Theoretically, our results support legitimacy 
theory, which explains that these poor performers may dis-
close more species as they negatively impact biodiversity 
through illegal wildlife trade and lack robust regulations, and 
therefore, our results may benefit regulators with assisting 
in preventing further species loss. Deep ecology explains 
that to achieve SDGs 14 and 15, these poor performers must 
begin to consider species as a stakeholder to prevent further 
extinctions. This implies that poor environmental perform-
ers are more likely to seek environmental legitimacy and 
more stakeholders’ satisfaction by reporting useful B/E 
information.
In Hypothesis 3, we predict that to get an award to nar-
row the legitimacy gap and prove a deep concern for nature, 
Table 4  Poisson regression results for the likelihood of number of 
species disclosed
The table reports the effects of assurance, environment award, pres-
ence of partnership and red Industry on the number of reported spe-
cies in firm’s annual report in each year. The data consists 599 firm-
year observations of top 200 firms listed in Global 500 firms for the 
year 2012, 2014 and 2016. Green industry is a dummy equal to 1 if 
the industry belongs to green industry and 1 if it is in red or amber 
industry. Natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size is 
used. Model 2 reports Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPL) 
regression with multi-way fixed effects. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the industry level and reported in parenthesis
***Denotes 1%, **denotes 5% and *denotes 10% significance level
Dependent variable: number of species
Poisson regression with 





Buying assurance 1.129** 1.131*
(0.498) (0.601)
Presence of partnership 4.093*** 4.111***
(0.446) (0.477)
Environment Score 1.533* 1.530**
(0.800) (0.701)
Environment award  − 1.948***  − 1.937***
(0.455) (0.454)
Big 4  − 1.675***  − 1.663***
(0.552) (0.543)
Green industry 0.226 0.233
(0.454) (1.093)
Firm size 0.059 0.062
(0.069) (0.085)
Log (revenue)  − 0.283  − 0.313
(0.366) (0.418)




CO2 emission  − 1.033*  − 1.055
(0.625) (0.822)
Log (forest area) 0.727* 0.726**
(0.384) (0.283)




Constant  − 15.481 1.021
(9.832) (13.564)
Observations 394 373
Pseudo  R2 0.776 0.773
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
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firms report a higher number of species. But, in Table 4, 
our empirical result shows an opposite sign in coefficients 
(Model 1: β = − 1.948, p < 0.001; Model 2: β = − 1.937, 
p < 0.001, respectively). These results are surprising as 
empirical B/E studies have found a positive relationship 
with companies gaining an award (Hassan et al., 2020b). 
Our results do not support prior literature (Adler et al., 2018; 
Atkins et al., 2014) that companies should showcase con-
servation efforts in protecting species and calls for further 
academic examination. Theoretically, this evidence suggests 
companies are disregarding species as stakeholders and 
neglecting deep ecology. Such a lack of sensitivity towards 
B/E will make it difficult in achieving the policymakers’ 
target of B/E prevention. Our justification for such results is 
due to lack of awareness and so far, there is no mandatory 
requirement to disclose on the number of species. This high-
lights that there is a huge call for awareness for species to 
be regarded as stakeholders by companies. Furthermore, our 
results suggest a shift in corporate governance consciousness 
to embed deep-ecological concern by protecting species and 
their habitats and to prevent future pandemics like COVID-
19. By viewing species as stakeholders post-pandemic, they 
are responsibly committing to achieving SDGs 14 and 15. 
Thus, if companies become ecologically conscious of the 
biodiversity crisis, environmental awards will demonstrate 
their commitment to sustainable development.
Further, we test the association between the presence 
of wildlife conservation partnership and number of spe-
cies. Models 1 and 2 show positive and statistically signifi-
cant coefficients (Model 1: β = 4.093, p < 0.001; Model 2: 
β = 4.111, p < 0.001, respectively). This implies that firms 
which have a wildlife conservation partnership are likely 
to disclose a greater number of species. This gives evi-
dence in favor of Hypothesis 4. Our results support prior 
studies (Adler et al., 2018; Boiral & Heras-Saizarbitoria, 
2017; Hassan et  al., 2020b) and highlight that wildlife 
partnerships are a key driver of companies protecting spe-
cies. This also implies additional empirical support for our 
multi-theoretical perspective that integrates insights from 
legitimacy, stakeholder, and deep ecology theories. Specifi-
cally, deep ecology explains how companies engaging in 
partnerships are preserving nature (Atkins et al., 2018), and 
confirms that companies view species as stakeholders by 
protecting their habitats and realizing their intrinsic worth. 
Our finding implies that companies respond to increased 
stakeholder expectation by proactively engaging in compre-
hensive wildlife conservation partnerships, which leads to 
better B/E-related activism and B/E reporting. Companies 
may indeed be showcasing conservation efforts to protect 
species and habitats to gain legitimacy (Adler et al., 2018). 
However, partnership engagement increases knowledge and 
can address the extinction crisis and prevent future pan-
demics. To meet SDGs 14 and 15, collaboration and shared 
knowledge are encouraged (Jones & Solomon, 2013). Our 
results imply that partnership association can help develop 
solutions (Bebbington & Unerman, 2018; Gibassier et al., 
2020) and achieve a sustainable future. This evidence is also 
in line with our multi-theoretical framework that implies 
that companies use these mechanisms as public relationships 
instruments to legitimize their existence (e.g., Adler et al., 
2018; Hassan et al., 2020b) and oversee the perceptions of 
the pertinent stakeholders (Bhattacharyya & Yang, 2019).
Finally, regarding control variables, we find Governance, 
Forest area, and Inflation are statistically significant and 
positively related to the number of species, suggesting that 
country-level variables are key determinants of disclosure on 
the number of species. Overall, our hypotheses are mostly 
supported by our empirical findings.
Robustness Tests
In the previous section, we use Poisson regression to inves-
tigate the relationship between company-level variables 
(such as assurance, presence of partnerships, firm size) to 
the number of species. In this section, we analyze our data 
in three phases: (1) dividing the data into two sub-samples, 
based on the firms headquarter, in developed and develop-
ing countries; (2) analyzing the full sample by taking care 
of over-dispersion of the data by reclassifying the sample 
into four groups based on the number of species disclosed, 
and (3) dividing the sample into financial and non-financial 
companies.
In our first test, we report the results of the variables that 
influence companies to commit to a greater number of spe-
cies disclosure and how those variables work among firms 
operating in developed and developing countries. The results 
of Poisson regression at the firm-level data for developed 
and developing countries are reported in Table 5.
Our findings in Table 5 mostly support our hypotheses. 
Table 5 reveals that Environment Score and Environment 
Award have a significant impact on disclosure of the number 
of species protected in companies that operate in developing 
environments compared with their counterparts that oper-
ate in developed countries. These findings are supported 
by the legitimacy theory expectation that companies from 
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Table 5  Robustness tests: 
Poisson regression
The table reports the effects of assurance, environment award, presence of partnership and green Industry 
on the number of reported species in firm’s annual report in each year. The data consists 599 firm-year 
observations of top 200 firms listed in Global 500 firms for the year 2012, 2014 and 2016. nSpecies-coded 
from 0 to 4–0 if the number of species is 0, and 1–4 if the number of species is in the range of 1–99, 100–
199, 200–299, 300 and more respectively. Green industry is a dummy equal to 1 if the industry belongs to 
green industry and 1 if it is in red or amber industry. Natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm 
size is used. Column 3 reports Zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis
***Denotes 1%, **denotes 5% and *denotes 10% significance level
Dependent variables Developed country Developing country Full sample (ZIP)
Poisson regression Zero-inflated 
Poisson regres-
sion
Number of species nSpecies
(1) (2) (3)
Buying assurance 0.427 2.314*** 0.100*
(0.541) (0.560) (0.059)
Presence of partnership 4.029*** 2.765*** 0.070**
(0.466) (0.431) (0.030)
Environment score  − 0.486 2914.660***  − 0.109**
(2.572) (630.495) (0.046)
Environment award  − 2.110*** 1.854*** 0.139**
(0.685) (0.469) (0.062)
Big 4  − 1.867***  − 1.951**  − 0.066
(0.549) (0.821) (0.102)
Green industry n.a. n.a. 0.054
(0.039)
Firm size 0.156**  − 0.743***  − 0.004
(0.075) (0.169) (0.013)
Log (revenue)  − 0.871* 1.481***  − 0.029
(0.489) (0.246) (0.049)
Leverage  − 0.000***  − 0.057***  − 0.001
(0.000) (0.015) (0.001)
Governance  − 6.800 9.205*** 0.001
(6.130) (2.300) (0.246)
CO2 emission  − 0.588 2.534* n.a.
(0.671) (1.317)
Log (forest area) 0.399  − 266.271*** 0.027
(0.463) (58.215) (0.030)
GDP growth  − 0.193  − 1.078***  − 0.037**
(0.541) (0.334) (0.018)
Inflation 1.268**  − 1.196***  − 0.019
(0.565) (0.310) (0.043)
Constant 9.234 3191.847*** 0.005
(11.970) (696.727) (0.420)
Observations 282 112 587
Pseudo  R2 0.807 0.924 n.a.
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
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developing countries want to portray a positive corporate 
image and influence stakeholder perception (Hassan et al., 
2020b; Tagesson et al., 2009). Similarly, we find that assur-
ance has a significant positive effect on disclosure of the 
number of species protected in companies that operate in 
developing environments, compared to their counterparts 
operating in developed countries. Overall, the results support 
our claim that institutional context has a moderating effect 
on the relationship between Environment Score, Environ-
ment Award, Assurance, and disclosure of the number of 
species.
In the second test, we reclassified our dependent variable 
scores into a number of classifications. The first classifica-
tion includes all companies which scored zero; the second 
classification contains companies which scored between 1 
and 99. The third classification contains companies which 
scored between 100 and 199, and the fourth classification 
those which scored between 200 and 299 and more.
Let us consider Yi an observable variable having discrete 
numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 based on the reported number of 
species. Let y∗
i
 represent an unobservable variable that cap-
tures the level of concerns for biodiversity—proxied by the 
number of species of ith firm. The outcome of diversity can 
be represented as a function of a vector of explanatory vari-
ables (xi) and relevant control variables using the following 
linear relationship:
where  is a vector of unknown parameters. Let us consider 
mi and y∗i  are related to the observable variable Yi . Consider 
mi as four levels of the reported number of species represent-
ing the extent of biodiversity by ith firm. mi determines five 
observed values as below:
Let x denote the vector of explanatory variables that 
influence the number of reported species y* and which are 






controls + ui,whereui ∼ N(0,1)




















(4)y∗ = x� + 
The probability of observed Y can be estimated by the 
ordered Probit model. However, following Lambert (1992) 
we use a zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model to measure the 
relationship between disclosure on the number of species 
protected and the rest of the research variables denoted as 
y*, by each sample firm in the years 2012, 2014, and 2016. 
The results show that buying assurance, presence of partner-
ship, environment score, and award are in line with the pre-
vious findings reported in Table 4. However, the coefficient 
of Big4 is negative but not statistically significant. Overall, 
Table 6  Robustness tests: Poisson regression results
The table reports the effects of assurance, environment award, pres-
ence of partnership and red Industry on the number of reported spe-
cies in firm’s annual report in each year. The data consists 599 firm-
year observations of top 200 firms listed in Global 500 firms for the 
year 2012, 2014 and 2016. Green industry is a dummy equal to 1 if 
the industry belongs to green industry and 1 if it is in red or amber 
industry. Natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size is 
used. All control variables are included in both Models 1 and 2 but 
not shown and Poisson regression is used. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the industry level and reported in parenthesis
***Denotes 1%, **denotes 5% and *denotes 10% significance level
Non-financial firms Financial firms
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent variable: num-
ber of species
 Buying assurance 2.312*** 0.660
(0.851) (1.081)
 Presence of partnership 0.196  − 1.542*
(1.052) (0.838)
 Environment score 1.761**  − 18.715***
(0.782) (2.575)
 Environment award  − 1.628**  − 0.987
(0.774) (0.816)
 Big 4  − 2.448**  − 0.371
(1.140) (0.833)
 Green industry 4.216*** n.a
(1.609)
 All control variables Included Included
 Constant 7.091  − 8.222
(8.962) (9.830)
 Observations 394 96
 Pseudo  R2 0.568 0.342
 Country fixed effects Yes Yes
 Year fixed effects Yes Yes
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we show that our results are robust with different specifica-
tions of estimations.
Further, we present the third test of robustness and divide 
the sample into financial and non-financial companies (see 
Table 6). The results show that buying assurance, environ-
mental score, and award from non-financial firms are in line 
with previous findings.
Addressing Endogeneity
Our study uses a Poisson regression model to support the 
hypotheses (see Table 4). However, the model is likely to 
suffer from endogeneity. For instance, our sample firms 
with stronger corporate governance tend to disproportion-
ally report the name of the species (source of selection bias). 
In addition, the presence of stronger governance may lead 
to a higher number of reported species. On the other hand, 
it is also possible that firms with better awareness of B/E 
tend to attract and hire more expert directors to the board 
and improve their corporate governance (source of reverse 
causality). The same argument is true for the environment 
award variable. To deal with these issues, we use two dif-
ferent methods. Firstly, we follow Geraci et al. (2018) to 
estimate our model by two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI). 
Following Lin et al. (2017), we use an instrumental vari-
able, sindustry—a dummy variable equal to 1 if our sample 
firms belong to environmentally sensitive industries, such 
as energy, chemical, and materials, and 0 otherwise. We use 
the endogenous variable environment award as a dependent 
variable and sindustry and other exogenous variables (used 
in Table 4) as independent variables of a logistic model (first 
stage). We calculate the residual from this first stage and 
include this residual in the second stage of the same Pois-
son model (as in Tables 4 and 5). The results are reported in 
Column 4 of Table 7.
In the second approach, in accordance with Quigley et al. 
(2019), we employ a propensity score matching (PSM) pro-
cedure to form matched sets of treated and control firms 
which share a similar value on the propensity score (see 
Heckman & Todd, 2009). This is also a two-step procedure. 
We construct a dummy variable lgovernance equal to 1 if 
a firm has a governance score less than the industry aver-
age governance score, and 0 otherwise. We run a logistic 
model to estimate the probability that a firm would buy 
an external assurance with weaker governance score. This 
regression generates a propensity score. We follow Dehejia 
and Wahba (2002) to match each treatment firm to a control 
firm using the nearest neighbor algorithm with replacement 
and setting the caliper to 0.25*standard error of the propen-
sity score. Appendix B shows each covariate (control vari-
ables reported) after the PSM procedure across treatment 
and control firms. We re-estimate the matched sample with 
a negative binomial regression. The results are reported in 
Columns 1–3 of Table 7.14 The likelihood ratio of  Chi2 test 
for the joint significance of independent variables is statis-
tically significant and therefore indicates a good model fit. 
Overall, both the procedures qualitatively support our main 
results and hypotheses.
Developing solutions and providing examples 
from EC/FT companies
From the empirical findings, we suggest how companies 
can help to achieve SDGs 14 and 15 and lead future report-
ing in sustainable development. B/E accounting aligns with 
wider disciplines in CSR research, such as global warming 
and climate concerns. High on the economic agenda from 
the COVID-19 recovery is the movement from a vulner-
able ‘business as usual’ to a sustainable ‘green recovery’, 
rebalancing the human relationship with nature (Por-
ritt, 2020). Failure to provide sustainable solutions, and 
if efforts to achieve the wider UN goals, including SDGs 
14 and 15 are not met, the planet could be heading for an 
apocalyptic crisis. We believe that due to the urgency of 
the wider global environmental challenges facing humanity 
(Sobkowiak et al., 2020), developing solutions is a matter 
of urgency. We anticipate post COVID-19, biodiversity and 
species accountability will be a core element of corporate 
reporting. Companies must be responsible for committing to 
achieving SDGs 14 and 15, as a failure to protect and con-
serve nature will have a catastrophic financial impact (WEF, 
2020). Our results indicate that pre-COVID-19, only 25% of 
companies embedded an in-depth ecological perspective and 
valued species as stakeholders, which can explain positive 
relations with species numbers and companies gaining assur-
ance and partnership engagement. Furthermore, our results 
indicate there must be a seismic shift from poor environ-
mental performers and companies who wish to gain awards, 
to consider species as stakeholders, and align with global 
sustainability. Inspired by SDGs 14 and 15, we explain that 
if companies collectively implement B/E reporting, this may 
offer solutions for a sustainable society. As such, rethink-
ing accounting frameworks and guidelines is needed (SER, 
2016), and accounting professionals need to know how they 
can incorporate the B/E into their activities. For instance, 
Royal Dutch Shell displays responsible disclosure:
“When we operate in critical habitats—those that are 
rich in biodiversity and important to conservation—we 
14 We use Pearson  Chi2 test for observed and expected count frequen-
cies over time and we find that our results are statistically significant 
at 5% level. This means, for instance, there is a significant relation-
ship between number of species and presence of partnership (or 
environment award)  Chi2 (20) = 165.014, obs-599, p < 0.00 (or  Chi2 
(20) = 61.72, obs-599,  p < 0.00).
 L. Roberts et al.
1 3
Table 7  Robustness tests: 
addressing endogeneity
The table reports the effects of assurance, environment award, presence of partnership and green Industry 
on the number of reported species in firm’s annual report in each year. The data consists 599 firm-year 
observations of top 200 firms listed in Global 500 firms for the year 2012, 2014 and 2016. Green industry 
is a dummy equal to 1 if the industry belongs to green industry and 1 if it is in red or amber industry. Natu-
ral logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size is used. Columns (1)–(3) reports Negative Binomial 
regressions after using propensity score matching. Column (4) represents the 2-Stage Residual Inclusion 
(2SRI) regression. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis
***Denotes 1%, **denotes 5% and *denotes 10% significance level
Negative binomial regression 2SRI
Dependent variable Number of species
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Buying assurance 1.694** 1.456***
(0.855) (0.537)
Presence of partnership 3.354*** 5.004***
(0.603) (0.533)
Environment score 1.488*** 4.213***
(0.526) (0.936)
Environment award  − 14.229**  − 8.838***
(5.544) (1.654)
Big 4  − 0.881 1.056** 0.277  − 1.744***
(0.757) (0.522) (0.510) (0.513)
Green industry  − 0.044  − 0.445  − 0.398  − 0.037
(0.642) (0.424) (0.720) (0.413)
Firm size  − 0.276***  − 0.615***  − 0.309**  − 0.114*
(0.100) (0.152) (0.131) (0.064)
Log (revenue) 0.945** 0.757 0.970*  − 0.563*
(0.457) (0.491) (0.543) (0.310)
Leverage 0.060  − 0.043 0.610*  − 0.001
(0.047) (0.057) (0.360) (0.004)
Governance n.a. n.a. n.a. 7.028***
(1.723)
CO2 emission  − 0.155*  − 0.120*  − 0.310  − 1.516***
(0.084) (0.072) (3.036) (0.236)
Log (forest area) 0.638*** 0.182 3.436 1.796***
(0.246) (0.303) (4.688) (0.342)
GDP growth  − 0.575***  − 0.168 0.081  − 1.220***
(0.162) (0.164) (0.626) (0.216)
Inflation  − 0.285  − 0.420** 0.115 0.736**
(0.234) (0.200) (0.376) (0.305)
Residual from 1st stage 3.128***
(0.661)
Constant  − 13.994**  − 6.036  − 45.575  − 28.562***
(5.758) (6.391) (67.998) (7.855)
LR  Chi2 44.90** 59.38*** 46.38**
(0.016) (0.000) (0.017)
Observations 114 114 114 369
Pseudo  R2 0.072 0.151 0.194 0.799
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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apply stringent mitigation standards. We were also the 
first in the energy industry to introduce a biodiversity 
standard.” (Royal Dutch Shell, company website).
This demonstrates how companies can regard species as 
stakeholders by transparently disclosing their efforts for 
nature to flourish. For example, Volkswagen has stated its 
efforts in protecting and restoring biodiversity and species 
as follows:
“In the grounds of the Volkswagen factory in Emden, 
a colony of bees on the verge of extinction (Apis mil-
lifica) has been successfully established, growing from 
5000 to 40,000 bees in just a short space of time. Plans 
are underway to plant a further 1000 fruit trees to 
ensure a plentiful supply of food for the bees.” (Volk-
swagen, CSR report, 2014).
Summary and Conclusion
The main aim of this paper is to explore the disclo-
sure of the number of species from the top 200 Fortune 
Global companies to understand how EC/FT companies 
are answering the collapse of biodiversity and threat of 
further species extinction. We create and test with Pois-
son pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) regression, the 
relationship between the number of species protected and 
its determinant factors. Using a comprehensive sample 
of Fortune Global companies from before the COVID-19 
pandemic, from 2012, 2014, and 2016, our results reveal 
that 75% of reports omit any species numbers, showing 
that most companies are failing to address the B/E crisis. 
However, the remaining 25% present how EC/FT compa-
nies have initiated efforts before the current pandemic, 
which can influence companies’ reporting in the post 
COVID-19 era. We contribute to developing solutions 
with this empirical study by extending B/E literature and 
encouraging companies to provide responsible reporting 
and disclose B/E accountability to align with SDGs 14 
and 15.
The empirical model is based on a comprehensive theo-
retical framework. These findings support prior B/E dis-
closure studies that have found that few companies provide 
B/E information (Adler et al., 2018; Hassan et al., 2020b). 
This evidences a huge call for companies to make trans-
formational changes from anthropocentrism, given the 
urgency of the extinction crisis and existential threat to 
civilization (Ceballos et al., 2020). The link to COVID-19 
and human infringement with nature through illegal wild-
life markets and trade is inextricably linked to business 
survival. Corporates are dependent on natural resources 
and must cease to be disrespectful to nature and engage in 
stewardship of natural assets (Jones, 1996). However, we 
focus on the remaining EC/FT companies (25%) that are 
responding to the extinction crisis and showing efforts to 
conserve and protect habitats. Supporting deep ecology 
theory and recognizing species as stakeholders, these com-
panies are displaying responsible corporate governance 
by embedding deep ecological culture. Specifically, our 
regression presents significant relationships between the 
number of species disclosed and assurance, poor environ-
mental performers, presence of partnerships, and gaining 
environmental awards (refer to Fig. 2). Our results imply 
that there is a huge call for corporate consciousness and 
opportunity for companies to display their responsible 
efforts.
These findings make an important contribution to B/E 
literature in at least four ways. First, our results suggest 
assurance for B/E reporting as one important channel 
through which corporate governance may influence B/E 
outcomes, ascertaining a clear mechanism through which 
external corporate governance may influence the firm’s 
B/E reporting. Second, to our knowledge, this study is 
the first to directly measure the number of species using a 
comprehensive dataset. Thus, we can demonstrate a clear 
positive relationship between environmental performance 
(incentives for species protection) and species reporting, 
contributing to the nascent but growing research investi-
gating how environmental performance and species report-
ing activities might be associated. Third, we contribute 
more broadly to the literature by improving the under-
standing of the antecedents of species reporting of firms 
using a cross-country sample. Fourth, this study extends 
the extant B/E literature by taking species reporting into 
consideration in a country-level institutional context. It has 
been argued in the accounting literature that developing 
economies suggest an interesting setting that explores both 
regular questions in addition to a unique phenomenon (Lau 
et al., 2016). Last, we suggest a reporting strategy for com-
panies to achieve wider global efforts of achieving SDGs 
14 and 15 by advocating B/E accountability. Our evidence 
shows that institutional context has a moderating effect on 
the relationship between environment score, environment 
award, assurance, and disclosure of the number of species.
These results have several implications. Our evidence 
implies that businesses should begin to realize the intrin-
sic worth of natural capital and their reliance on balanced 
ecosystems to survive. Embedding ecological culture and 
aligning with societal and government expectation to prevent 
further pandemics will be crucial for future organizational 
survival. Additionally, our findings suggest that companies 
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who engage with wildlife partnerships are leading in the 
protection of species. These results imply that partnerships 
are a key driver in preventing further species extinctions and 
preventing pandemics. The collaboration between wildlife 
and biodiversity experts and companies can achieve long-
term sustainability and contribute to developing solutions. 
Our work can also guide policymakers in developed and 
developing nations to the need to improve the surveillance 
and capacity of the regulatory frameworks in the context 
of B/E reporting, and to improve stakeholders’ pressures to 
enhance B/E reporting adoption. Specifically, policymakers 
and regulators need to make a generally agreed set of B/E 
reporting guidelines and assurance standards. Collectively, 
the visionary SDGs can be met by the targeted 2030, as fail-
ure to meet these targets will have severe consequences to 
societal health and economic systems. This research aligns 
with the United Nations initiatives and post 2020 biodiver-
sity frameworks and will guide decision-makers to under-
stand how disclosure of species protection by companies can 
assist society to mitigate such risks in the future.
One of the caveats of this study is that our sample is a 
qualitatively small representation of a larger population 
to which it could apply. Our sample selection is limited to 
the top 200 companies from the Fortune Global. There-
fore, future studies could extend the number of companies 
or countries. Second, counting species numerically on its 















Fig. 2  Factors influencing B/E reporting
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own is not enough to advance solutions. Although this 
research provides a seminal understanding of the relation-
ship between species and key determinants, additional 
future research might qualitatively examine corporate 
motivations and emotions for such disclosure, in order 
to support our findings. Third, future studies might con-
sider case-studies and interviews with executives, boards, 
shareholders, and stakeholders to investigate their views 
on corporate initiatives to protect species and biodiversity, 
and to align with the SDGs. There is a distinct lack of 
primary data analysis in B/E literature; this would provide 
invaluable insights into company motivations to protect 
species. Also, there are undoubtedly other factors affecting 
the number of species disclosed, such as ethnic identity, 
religion, country-level or industry-specific factors, which 
requires an expanded dataset to consider these additional 
indicators. Research on why and how companies’ engage-
ment in biodiversity loss and species extinction report-
ing differs across nations is a promising avenue for future 
work. In addition, exploring the influence of ethical deci-
sion making on biodiversity loss and species extinction 
reporting across cultures would be a fruitful avenue for 
further work. Furthermore, a potential avenue for future 
research is to investigate the alignment of B/E, circular 
economy model, and integrated reporting to enhance the 
development of solutions for a sustainable society.
Appendix A
Variance inflation factor (VIF)
Variable VIF Tolerance
Number of species 1.04 0.9593
Buying assurance 1.56 0.6396
Environment score 1.29 0.7755
Green 1.19 0.8397
Environment award 1.14 0.8799
Presence of partnership 1.27 0.7853
Big 4 1.51 0.6639
Firm size 1.19 0.8402
Log (revenue) 1.20 0.8306
Leverage 1.03 0.9668
Governance 5.88 0.1701
CO2 emission 2.91 0.3442
Log (forest area) 2.96 0.3381
GDP growth 3.24 0.3083
Inflation 1.79 0.5586
Appendix B




Big 4 U 0.379 0.395  − 0.36




U 0.310 0.800  − 12.96***
M 0.632 0.596 0.38
Firm size U 12.304 12.569  − 1.16
M 12.494 12.728  − 0.51
Log (rev-
enue)
U 11.516 11.277 4.95***
M 11.294 11.376  − 0.89
Leverage U 2.089 9591.4  − 0.63




U 9.501 10.808  − 2.58**




U 13.450 13.269 0.99
M 13.478 13.393 0.21
GDP 
growth
U 3.662 2.473 5.33***
M 3.366 2.794 1.18
Inflation U 1.7603 1.466 2.18
M 1.3614 1.603  − 1.08
Firms with low governance and high governance score for unmatched 
and matched samples.
***Denotes 1%, **denotes 5% and *denotes 10% significance level.
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